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UNSAFE & UNSOUND: THE FUTURE OF
SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES AFTER
UNITED STATES V. SAFEHOUSE
Chloe Rigogne*
In the past few years, the United States has experienced a dramatic
increase in drug overdose deaths due to factors such as a growing prevalence
of synthetic opioids like fentanyl and the strains brought on by the COVID-19
pandemic. In response to the overdose crisis, states and municipalities have
started considering once-taboo harm reduction practices, including the
implementation of supervised injection sites that facilitate individuals’ use of
drugs under the care and supervision of medical professionals. However,
supervised injection sites may run afoul of 21 U.S.C. § 856—often referred
to as the “crack house” statute—a law introduced in the 1980s as a response
to fears about crack cocaine. After years of uncertainty about how courts
would interpret the statute if faced with such a supervised injection site case,
in 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first
circuit court to rule on a challenge to a supervised injection site, ultimately
holding that a Philadelphia site—the first in the United States—violates the
crack house statute.
This Note examines the competing interpretations of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) in
United States v. Safehouse—the first case to decide whether supervised
injection sites violate the crack house statute. This Note argues that the text
of the statute is ambiguous and suggests that the proper interpretation
requires looking beyond the text. Using extratextual aids, this Note
concludes by arguing that the best reading of the statute prohibits the
expansion of its reach to cover supervised injection sites.
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Bonnie Milas remembers chasing her son down the street in her
bathrobe trying to stop him from buying drugs.1 She remembers wrestling
with him as he held a full syringe in his hand, ready to inject heroin.2 She
remembers pulling a bathroom door off its hinges to rescue him, and
physically restraining him to prevent him from jumping out of a second-story
1. Bonnie Milas, Opinion, I Lost Both My Sons to Opioids: But Here’s What I Remember
About Them on Mother’s Day, USA TODAY (May 8, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2020/05/08/mothers-day-remembering-mytwo-sons-lost-opioids-doctor-column/5175089002/ [https://perma.cc/MLE2-S3JB].
2. Id.
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window.3 Despite all of her best efforts, Dr. Milas experienced the nightmare
every parent dreads: on January 6, 2018, her son died of a drug overdose.4
Fourteen months later, Dr. Milas’s older son, a “student-athlete of the year”
and medical school graduate, also died of a drug overdose.5 He was her only
other child.6 Though Dr. Milas’s story is unimaginably tragic, it is
unfortunately an all-too-common reality in the United States.
According to provisional data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), during the twelve-month period ending April 2021,
over one hundred thousand people died from drug overdoses in the United
States.7 This new record high is a 28.5 percent increase from the previous
year, with opioids continuing to account for most overdose deaths.8 The
growing spread of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl,9 along with the
devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on health-care systems10 and
individual health,11 has contributed to a continuous and rapid rise in overdose
deaths throughout the country.12
Nationwide, policy makers have offered and supported various ideas to try
to combat the growing toll that drug overdoses have taken on American
families. For instance, methadone clinics—sites that provide doses of
methadone and other medications that lessen the symptoms of withdrawal for
eligible patients dealing with opioid addiction—have opened at an increasing

3. Id.
4. Brief of Proposed Amicus Curiae Friends and Family of Victims of Opioid Addiction,
as an Interested Non-Party Supporting Safehouse and Jose Benitez at 32, United States v.
Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021) (No. 20-1422).
5. Id. at 31.
6. Id.
7. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Drug Overdose Deaths in the
U.S. Top 100,000 Annually (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_
press_releases/2021/20211117.htm [https://perma.cc/X67Y-GDD2].
8. Id.
9. See Julie O’Donnell et al., Trends in and Characteristics of Drug Overdose Deaths
Involving Illicitly Manufactured Fentanyls—United States, 2019–2020, 70 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1740, 1741 (2021) (showing an increase in overdose deaths involving
illicitly manufactured fentanyls from 2019 to 2020).
10. See Amy Sokolow, Opioid Overdoses Have Skyrocketed amid Coronavirus, but States
Are Nevertheless Slashing Addiction Treatment Program Budgets, STAT (July 16, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/16/opioid-overdoses-have-skyrocketed-amid-thecoronavirus-but-states-are-nevertheless-slashing-addiction-treatment-program-budgets/
[https://perma.cc/7UKW-NNCS] (citing Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Oregon, and Utah as examples of states that have cut millions in funding for opioid crisis
programs and substance use disorder services).
11. See Nirmita Panchal et al., The Implications of COVID-19 for Mental Health and
Substance Use, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid19/issue-brief/the-implications-of-covid-19-for-mental-health-and-substance-use/
[https://perma.cc/NQL7-5K97].
12. See HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DRUG
OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2019, at 5 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/databriefs/db428.pdf [https://perma.cc/292V-LMBT]; Tara Law, Fentanyl and
COVID-19 May Have Made the Opioid Epidemic Even Deadlier, TIME (Dec. 16, 2021,
1:17 PM), https://time.com/6128982/fentanyl-pandemic-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/
7DTF-YGZM].
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rate in the past several years.13 The use of needle exchange programs also
continues to grow throughout the country.14 One state even proposed a
program that would offer cash, in exchange for a clean drug test, to people
who use drugs.15
Despite these proposals and treatments, drug overdoses and deaths have
continued to rise,16 leaving many desperate for an alternative. A new
suggestion has emerged as a possible tool to reduce overdose deaths:
supervised injection sites.
But while the gravity of the opioid epidemic and overdose deaths is
evident, the legality of supervised injection sites to treat the problem is less
clear, in part due to a federal statute often referred to as the “crack house”
statute. The statute, first enacted in the 1980s,17 makes it illegal for people
to “[m]aintain[] drug-involved premises.”18 Thus, the fact that supervised
injection sites provide a place where some visitors can use drugs may violate
the statute, depending on one’s interpretation of it.
Musings of how courts might apply the statute to supervised injection sites
have circulated for years but have remained relatively theoretical,19 since
13. See Christine Vestal, Long Stigmatized, Methadone Clinics Multiply in Some States,
PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/10/31/long-stigmatized-methadone-clinics-multiply-insome-states [https://perma.cc/6JF5-TVB6]. By federal regulation, patients at methadone
clinics must meet certain criteria to be eligible for treatment. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Health Department Rolls Out Methadone Delivery
Program for New Yorkers Impacted by COVID-19 (May 19, 2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/doh/about/press/pr2020/methadone-delivery-program.page
[https://perma.cc/ZZS4DXZC] (discussing the federal regulations of methadone including requiring those who take
methadone to regularly go to an opioid treatment program to pick up the medication, though
regulations have loosened somewhat due to the pandemic). Further, while there are some
public methadone clinics, some states—such as Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
West Virginia, and Wyoming—have caps on the number of clinics that can open within the
state. See Vestal, supra.
14. See, e.g., Liora Engel-Smith, NC Needle Exchange Programs Expand Their Reach
Despite
the
Odds,
NC
HEALTH
NEWS
(Aug.
29,
2019),
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2019/08/29/nc-needle-exchange-programssucceed-despite-odds/ [https://perma.cc/KG6V-7MUL]; Emma Gibson, Arizona Legalizes
Clean Needle Exchange Sites, ARIZ. PUB. MEDIA (May 27, 2021, 12:27 AM),
https://www.azpm.org/s/87081-arizona-legalized-clean-need-exchange-sites/
[https://perma.cc/6BCS-3SPA].
15. S.B. 110, 2021–22 Leg. (Cal. 2021). While the governor vetoed this particular bill,
other private organizations, such as the San Francisco AIDS Foundation, run similar
contingency management programs that are privately funded. See Adam Beam, California
Looking to Pay Drug Addicts to Stay Sober, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021, 12:58 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-08-26/california-looking-to-pay-drugaddicts-to-stay-sober [https://perma.cc/4MPJ-N5EG].
16. See Press Release, supra note 7.
17. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1841(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-52
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 856).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 856.
19. See, e.g., Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the
United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 234 (2008). See generally Ben Longnecker, Note,
Federal Ignorance and the Battle for Supervised Injection Sites, 74 U. MIA. L. REV. 1145
(2020) (discussing theories of federalism as reasons for why federal challenges to supervised
injection sites could be unsuccessful).
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supervised injection sites did not yet exist in the United States despite
advocates and some legislators pushing for their implementation.20 The fact
that the government historically used the statute to prosecute egregious drug
activity, such as facilitating drug sales out of a defendant’s home21 or
operating a bar where the defendant-owner encouraged and engaged in
buying drugs,22 made the question even less clear. In 2019, however,
Philadelphia announced plans to open the first supervised injection site in the
nation,23 setting up the anticipated showdown between the crack house
statute and supervised injection sites.
Through an examination of United States v. Safehouse24 (Safehouse II),
this Note seeks to analyze the novel application of 21 U.S.C. § 856—the
crack house statute—to supervised injection sites. While scholarship has
theorized how courts would apply the statute to a supervised injection site,
Safehouse II is the first case demonstrating how a circuit court addresses the
interaction of such sites with the statute; and with other supervised injection
sites opening, the question of what other courts will do following this
decision will potentially save, or risk, thousands of lives.
Part I lays out the relevant background for understanding the tension
between supervised injection sites and the federal crack house statute.
Specifically, Part I.A explains the definition, history, and uses of supervised
injection sites, particularly in the context of the opioid epidemic. Part I.B
proceeds by explaining the background of the federal crack house statute,
including its legislative history and its prior applications.
Part II describes the two conflicting interpretations of the crack house
statute when applied to supervised injection sites, as articulated by the
various judges and parties in the Safehouse case. Part II.A begins with the
Third Circuit majority opinion and discusses the legal support for the
conclusion that supervised injection sites fall within the statute’s reach. Part
II.B lays out the arguments that contrast with the Third Circuit’s approach,
largely focusing on the district court opinion in United States v. Safehouse25
(Safehouse I) and the dissent in Safehouse II.

20. See H.B. 123, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2021); S.B. 57, 2021–22 Leg. (Cal. 2021);
Kathryn Sotnik, Somerville Exploring Controversial Safe Injection Site: ‘People Have a Right
to Stay Alive,’ NBC BOS. (June 23, 2021, 8:14 PM), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/
somerville-exploring-controversial-safe-injection-site-people-have-a-right-to-stayalive/2413206/ [https://perma.cc/4356-YNB8]; Trisha Thadani, S.F. Working to Open
Supervised Drug Use Site by Spring, Possibly in Building Near the Tenderloin, S.F. CHRON.
(Nov. 16, 2021, 7:44 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sf/article/S-F-working-to-opensupervised-drug-use-site-by-16626514.php [https://perma.cc/JR98-573Y].
21. See generally United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1993).
22. See generally United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999).
23. See Press Release, City of Phila., City Announces Progress on Opioid Task Force
Recommendations (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.phila.gov/2018-01-23-city-announcesprogress-on-opioid-task-force-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/T8F2-3DPF].
24. 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
25. 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
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Finally, Part III argues that § 856(a)(2) should be interpreted to exclude
supervised injection sites. Part III.A explains that looking merely to the text
of the statute or to its prior interpretations provides no clear answer as to
whether supervised injection sites fall under the statute. Part III.B then
advocates for looking beyond the text to legislative history and to the rule of
lenity to provide clarity as to the statute’s meaning, and ultimately concludes
that these tools of interpretation support a narrow reading of the statute that
excludes supervised injection sites. Lastly, Part III.C ends with broader
constitutional and policy arguments for why this interpretation is not only
sound but also necessary given the current state of affairs regarding drug
overdose deaths in the United States.
I. SETTING THE SCENE: SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES AND THE CRACK
HOUSE STATUTE
Prior to Safehouse II, it was unclear how a circuit court might evaluate a
supervised injection site under the crack house statute. This part lays out the
foundation of the clash between supervised injection sites and the federal
crack house statute. Part I.A begins by describing supervised injection sites
and their place within the larger scheme of harm reduction approaches to
drug use and related harms. Part I.B examines the text and history of the
crack house statute and details the major cases that have interpreted the
statute prior to Safehouse I and Safehouse II.
A. Supervised Injection Sites
Supervised injection sites—also known as overdose prevention centers
(OPC), drug consumption rooms (DCR), or safe injection facilities (SIF)—
are places where individuals can go to consume pre-acquired drugs26 under
the supervision of trained staff.27 Trained workers at the sites can offer
visitors general medical advice and referrals to seek treatment or social
services, provide sterile needles, answer questions about safe injection
practices, monitor individuals for overdose, and administer
overdose-reversal agents or first aid if necessary.28
The first supervised injection site was established in the Netherlands in the
1970s, and in 1986, the first government-authorized site opened in Berne,

26. Supervised injection sites do not provide visitors with drugs but do provide services
to those visitors who have already acquired drugs and bring them into the facility. See
Supervised Consumption Services, DRUG POL’Y ALL. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://drugpolicy.org/
resource/supervised-consumption-services [https://perma.cc/HC9P-JXG4]. Throughout this
Note, “pre-acquired” or “pre-obtained” denotes that the drugs visitors use or bring to a
supervised injection site were already purchased or acquired before visiting the facility.
27. See id. These names are often used interchangeably to refer to the same kinds of sites.
This Note uses the term “supervised injection site” to refer to the general category of facilities
that provide, among other services, a clean place for visitors to use pre-acquired drugs under
the care and supervision of trained medical professionals.
28. Beletsky et al., supra note 19, at 231.
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Switzerland.29 Since then, over one hundred facilities have opened around
the world, mostly in Europe,30 Australia,31 and Canada.32
Supervised injection sites are often included as part of a larger harm
reduction scheme to prevent drug overdose deaths and treat drug use.33
Advocates of harm reduction policies argue that regardless of the legality of
drug use, it is a fact that people will still use drugs.34 Because of this
inevitability, the goal of harm reduction is just as the name suggests: to
reduce the harms, such as disease and death, caused by drug use.35 Such
harm reduction schemes thus usually focus on destigmatizing drug use and
providing treatment alternatives to people who use drugs, as opposed to
focusing on punishing them through incarceration.36 Common harm
reduction approaches include implementing syringe exchange programs (like
those currently in place in the United States),37 providing users with overdose
reversal agents like naloxone, checking drugs for impurities such as fentanyl,
giving psychosocial support, and offering information and tips on safer drug
use practices.38
There is considerable evidence that harm reduction measures, including
opening supervised injection sites, are effective in reducing overall drug use,
preventing drug overdoses and deaths, and increasing the likelihood of
treatment.39 Despite the fact that overdoses still occur at supervised injection
29. See EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, DRUG CONSUMPTION
ROOMS:
AN OVERVIEW OF PROVISION AND EVIDENCE 2 (2018), https://
www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2734/POD_Drug%20consumption%20roo
ms.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPV9-33R4].
30. As of 2019, there were approximately ninety supervised injection sites operating
throughout Europe. See Cara Tabachnick, Safe Spaces for Users, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV., Spring 2019, at 8, 8.
31. Currently, there are two supervised injection sites operating in Australia. See AMANDA
ROXBURGH ET AL., ADAPTING HARM REDUCTION SERVICES DURING COVID-19: LESSONS
FROM THE SUPERVISED INJECTING FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA 2 (2021).
32. There are approximately thirty-seven government-authorized supervised consumption
sites in Canada. See Interactive Map: Canada’s Response to the Opioid Crisis, GOV’T OF
CAN. (July 29, 2021), https://health.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/
opioids/responding-canada-opioid-crisis/map.html [https://perma.cc/N6LN-LKYZ].
33. See What Is Harm Reduction?, HARM REDUCTION INT’L, https://www.hri.global/whatis-harm-reduction [https://perma.cc/CDF7-PT6V] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
34. See Principles of Harm Reduction, NAT’L HARM REDUCTION COAL.,
https://harmreduction.org/about-us/principles-of-harm-reduction/ [https://perma.cc/V8ZKR6JQ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
35. See id.; see also What Is Harm Reduction?, supra note 33.
36. See What Is Harm Reduction?, supra note 33.
37. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
Division H of the Consolidated Appropriations Act bans the use of federal funding for the
purchase of syringes or needles to be used for injecting any illegal drug, but the Act allows
local health departments to bypass the ban upon the determination that the area the department
serves “is experiencing, or is at risk for, a significant increase in hepatitis infections or an HIV
outbreak due to injection drug use.” Id.
38. See What Is Harm Reduction?, supra note 33.
39. See Chloé Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services:
What Has Been
Demonstrated?: A Systematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 48, 65
(2014) (reviewing seventy-five studies and concluding that supervised injection sites reduced
overdose deaths, promoted safer injection practices, and increased access to and use of health
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sites, no overdose deaths have been reported at such facilities.40 For instance,
at a supervised injection site in Germany, at least 3180 overdoses were
reversed between the years 2000 and 2013, with no deaths reported.41
Research also shows that the use of supervised injection facilities is generally
associated with quicker entry into drug treatment and recovery services.42
Studies also suggest that supervised injection facilities actually reduce
crime and other negative externalities, despite critics’ concerns to the
contrary.43 For instance, following the opening of a supervised injection site
in Vancouver, a study found that in the area surrounding the facility there
was a decrease in discarded syringes, public drug use, and the presence of
suspected drug dealers.44 Another study of a supervised injection site in
Sydney, Australia, showed that there was a 68 percent decrease in the number
of opioid overdose–related ambulance calls in the area surrounding the site
as compared to other areas without such a facility.45
Despite much of the evidence supporting the effectiveness of supervised
injection sites and related harm reduction strategies, public and political
support for such measures has been inconsistent. Some evidence suggests
that public attitudes have started shifting in favor of rehabilitation efforts for
people who use drugs, hinting that concerns about supervised injection sites
may eventually fade.46 There have also been recent political developments
services); SHARON LARSON ET AL., LANKENAU INST. FOR MED. RSCH., SUPERVISED
CONSUMPTION FACILITIES—REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 11–14 (2017), https://dbhids.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/OTF_LarsonS_PHLReportOnSCF_Dec2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5FN-PQ6K].
40. See ERIC ARMBRECHT ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV., SUPERVISED
INJECTION FACILITIES AND OTHER SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION SITES: EFFECTIVENESS AND
VALUE; FINAL EVIDENCE REPORT 22 (2021), https://icer.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
10/ICER_SIF_Final-Evidence-Report_010821.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5NT-CZS5]; Tanya
Albert Henry, Will the U.S. Get Its First Supervised Drug Consumption Site?, AM. MED. ASS’N
(Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/opioids/will-us-get-its-firstsupervised-drug-consumption-site [https://perma.cc/NR97-XD7S].
41. HARM REDUCTION COAL., ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC INJECTING 9 (2016),
https://harmreduction.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ResourceSupervisedConsumptionServices-AlternativestoPublicInjections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
AMW4-JYUX]. Though only open since December 2021, the first fully operational
supervised injection sites in the United States have received more than 10,000 visits and
reversed nearly 200 overdoses without a single death. See Samar Khurshid, ‘Clear Proof Lives
Have Been Saved’: Will New York Expand on First Overdose Prevention Centers?, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (Mar. 14, 2022), https://www.gothamgazette.com/state/11167-new-york-cityexpand-overdose-prevention-centers [https://perma.cc/J7RU-FGJ7].
42. See ARMBRECHT ET AL., supra note 40, at 20.
43. See Potier et al., supra note 39, at 64 (explaining that some opponents to these facilities
are concerned about concentrated drug use and increased drug trafficking and crime in the
vicinity).
44. See Evan Wood et al., Summary of Findings from the Evaluation of a Pilot Medically
Supervised Safer Injecting Facility, 175 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1399, 1400–01 (2006),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1635777/pdf/20061121s00020p1399.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34GM-ZWAR].
45. See A.M. Salmon et al., The Impact of a Supervised Injecting Facility on Ambulance
Call-Outs in Sydney, Australia, 105 ADDICTION 676, 678 (2010).
46. See, e.g., America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/04/02/section-1-perceptions-of-drug-abuse-
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that suggest a possible change in attitudes toward favoring harm reduction
measures. For instance, in 2015, Congress “lifted the decades-old ban on
federal funding for programs that provide sterile syringes.”47 More recently,
the Biden administration publicly committed to following an
“evidence-based harm reduction” approach to the drug overdose and
addiction crisis.48 As part of the American Rescue Plan—the coronavirus
relief package signed into law in 202149—Congress also approved a
$30 million Harm Reduction Grant Program that was designed to “support
community-based overdose prevention programs, syringe services programs,
and other harm reduction services” and that was notably exempt from the
long-standing ban on using federal funds to buy clean syringes.50
Harm reduction policies, however, have come under a fresh round of
political and public backlash, most recently with public outrage in response
to claims that funds from the American Rescue Plan were being used to
support programs that would distribute “crack pipes” as part of “safe smoking
kits.”51 Even though the Biden administration assured that the funds would
not be used in such a way, lawmakers introduced legislation imposing new
restrictions that would go so far as to extend the long-standing ban on federal
funding of clean needle purchases to the American Rescue Plan.52
Support for harm reduction programs in states and municipalities has also
fluctuated. For instance, Charleston, West Virginia, closed a harm reduction
program in 2018, three years after it opened.53 Additionally, some states
have passed laws making it harder to run syringe services despite the
overdose crisis.54 Although the science tends to support the efficacy of
views-of-drug-policies/ [https://perma.cc/HMD6-WTKX]. The 2014 survey found that 67
percent of the public believe the government should focus on providing treatment for, not
prosecuting, people who use illegal drugs. Id. Additionally, 63 percent of those surveyed said
that it was a good thing that state governments were moving away from mandatory minimum
sentences for nonviolent drug users, a significant increase from 47 percent in 2001. Id.
47. ETHAN NADELMANN & LINDSAY LASALLE, TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK:
CURRENT HARM REDUCTION POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2017).
48. See OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
BIDEN-HARRIS ADMINISTRATION’S STATEMENT OF DRUG POLICY PRIORITIES FOR YEAR
ONE 1, 4 (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BidenHarrisStatement-of-Drug-Policy-Priorities-April-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9SZ-C6ZC] (detailing
commitments to support research efforts regarding the “clinical effectiveness of emerging
harm reduction practices,” as well as identifying opportunities to expand access to naloxone
in communities with high overdose rates, and “amplify[ing] best practices for [fentanyl test
strips]”).
49. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
50. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Uproar over ‘Crack Pipes’ Puts Biden Drug Strategy at
Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/21/us/politics/bidenharm-reduction-crack-pipes.html [https://perma.cc/YT89-6HWJ].
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Joseph P. Williams, A Fight to Do No Harm, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019,
10:17 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2019-01-24/
opioid-crisis-harm-reduction-struggles-for-acceptance-in-us
[https://perma.cc/ENU3WNEL].
54. See Stolberg, supra note 50.
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supervised injection sites, the implementation of such facilities in the United
States nevertheless faces a challenge beyond public perception: federal law
may bar their existence.
B. The Federal Crack House Statute
While supervised injection sites have been operating in other countries55—
in some cases for decades56—the United States has been slower to implement
them. One reason for this lag is the legal ambiguity surrounding supervised
injection sites. As it stands, supervised injection sites may be illegal under a
federal law colloquially known as the “crack house” statute.57
1. Text and History of the Statute
The crack house statute, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 856, was originally
enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.58 The act was a
legislative response to the growing fear and moral condemnation of cocaine
use, which had intensified in the wake of basketball player Len Bias’s death
by drug overdose.59 Section 856(a)(1) of the 1986 statute made it illegal for
a person to “knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.”60 Section
856(a)(2) made it illegal to
manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner,
lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally
rent, lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the
building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing,
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.61

The statute aimed to punish those who use their property to run illegal drug
businesses, particularly those who operated so-called “crack houses” on their
property.62

55. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
57. See generally Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and the Federal Crack House Statute,
60 B.C. L. REV. 413 (2019).
58. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1841(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-52 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 856).
59. See DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM:
TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 1 (2006),
https://www.aclu.org/other/cracks-system-20-years-unjust-federal-crack-cocaine-law
[https://perma.cc/6SBC-8ELQ]. In June 1986, Len Bias, a college basketball star, shockingly
died of a drug overdose hours after his selection in the NBA draft. See id. His death came
during the emergence, and subsequent fear, of crack cocaine in the United States, prompting
assumptions that his overdose was a result of a crack cocaine overdose. See id. The
combination of Bias’s shocking death and the panic surrounding crack cocaine led to the swift
passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See id.
60. § 1841(a), 100 Stat. at 3207-52.
61. Id.
62. See Longnecker, supra note 19, at 1168.
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In 2003, Congress amended the statute following fears of teenagers using
ecstasy at raves.63 Initially introduced as the Reducing Americans’
Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act64 (“RAVE Act”), then later separately passed in
a different form as the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003,65 the
amendments broadened the crack house statute to encompass temporary
locations, indoor and outdoor venues, and one-off events.66 This was largely
seen as a means of targeting raves where drugs were being sold.67 The
statute, unchanged since the 2003 amendments, makes it unlawful to
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether
permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing,
or using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily,
either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and
knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for
use, with or without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.68

Violations of the statute can carry hefty penalties, with individuals facing a
potential prison term of up to twenty years, “a fine of not more than $500,000,
or both.”69 The statute also provides that “a person other than an
individual”—namely, a corporation—who violates the statute may be subject
to a fine of up to $2,000,000.70 Additionally, a person convicted under the
statute may be liable for civil penalties.71
Even though the statute has been in force since the 1980s, federal
prosecution under the statute is relatively infrequent.72 Prosecutors have
almost exclusively used the statute to charge individuals who are closely
involved with drug activity occurring on their property.73 The following
section provides a brief overview of the major cases that have interpreted the
statute, many of which illustrate the fact that prosecution under the statute is
almost exclusively limited to defendants who are intimately tied to the drug
activity occurring in the case.

63. See Kreit, supra note 57, at 430 n.94.
64. S. 2633, 107th Cong. (2002).
65. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see Kreit, supra note 57, at 430–31 & n.95 (discussing the legislative history behind
the RAVE Act).
66. See Longnecker, supra note 19, at 1168–69.
67. See id.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a).
69. Id. § 856(b).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 856(d).
72. See Kreit, supra note 57, at 430–31 (noting that in 2017, “a total of 19,750 federal
drug offenders were sentenced,” but “maintaining a drug-involved premise was the primary
offense of conviction for only twenty-four defendants who received federal sentences”).
73. See id. at 431 (citing studies showing that application of the statute is rather limited to
cases where defendants are closely involved with the drug activity); infra text accompanying
notes 76–109.
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2. Major Cases Interpreting the Statute
After the statute’s enactment, courts have been challenged to reconcile the
language in § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2), specifically regarding to whom the
so-called “purpose requirement”74 applies. The controversy largely revolves
around the language in § 856(a)(2) and whether the text only requires a third
party to have “the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance” or
whether it is the defendant who must specifically provide a place for the
purpose of facilitating a third party’s drug activity there.75 This section
outlines how courts have interpreted § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) outside the
context of supervised injection sites.
One of the first major cases to analyze the text and construction of
21 U.S.C. § 856(a) was a case in the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Chen.76
In Chen, the defendant owned and operated a motel that, over time, became
a hub of drug trafficking.77 The defendant was closely involved in the drug
activity occurring at her motel: she observed tenants use and deal drugs in
the motel rooms, stored their drugs and drug proceeds, encouraged them to
make drug sales to pay rent, loaned them money to buy drugs to resell, and
even warned tenants when she knew law enforcement planned to search
rooms.78 Chen was charged under § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2).79
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the language of the statute to evaluate whether
a jury instruction about deliberate ignorance was proper.80 Chen argued that
in order to convict her under § 856(a)(1), the government must prove she
“knowingly maintained a place for the specific purpose of distributing or
using a controlled substance.”81 The court first examined whether the phrase
“for the purpose of” in § 856(a)(1) refers to the defendant’s purpose of
engaging in illegal drug activity or whether it refers to a visitor’s purpose to
distribute or use drugs at the place.82
According to the court, the plain language of § 856(a)(1) unambiguously
requires the defendant be the one to act “for the purpose of” illegal drug
activity.83 The court said that “[i]n order to find that the purpose requirement
did not apply to [a defendant] who knowingly maintains the place, we would
have to twist the clear and plain language of the statute. This we cannot

74. In § 856(a)(1), the current language of the purpose requirement is “for the purpose of
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). In
§ 856(a)(2), the purpose requirement states, “for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing,
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.” Id. § 856(a)(2).
75. Id. § 856(a)(2).
76. 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 185.
78. Id. at 186.
79. Id. The Chen court applied the 1986 version of the statute. See supra text
accompanying notes 60–61.
80. Chen, 913 F.2d at 187–88.
81. Id. at 189.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 190; 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
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do.”84 The court further explained that “any other interpretation would
render § 856(a)(2) essentially superfluous.”85
The Fifth Circuit found that, unlike § 856(a)(1), § 856(a)(2) was written to
apply to persons who may have opened and maintained their property for an
innocent reason but who nevertheless “knowingly allowed others to engage
in [drug] activities by making the place ‘available for use . . . for the purpose
of unlawfully’ engaging in such activity.”86 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
§ 856(a)(1) requires the defendant maintain the place for her own “purpose
of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance,”87 while
§ 856(a)(2) does not require a defendant to have such a purpose.88 Section
856(a)(2), the court held, only requires that drug “activity is engaged in by
others” who have the purpose of engaging in such drug-related activity.89
Other circuits presented with this same question have followed the Fifth
Circuit’s reading of the statute. Shortly after Chen was decided, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Tamez,90 adopted the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation
of the statute.91 In Tamez, the defendant owned a used car dealership that
was used to distribute cocaine.92 Tamez was charged and convicted under
§ 856(a)(2) but appealed the jury verdict, arguing that it was unsound because
§ 856(a)(2) was intended only to apply to manufacturing operations or “crack
houses.”93 Therefore, Tamez contended that the statute could not apply to
him because it requires the defendant to intend that the building be used for
the purpose of drug activity, whereas his buildings were to be used only to
operate a used car dealership.94 Tamez sought to bolster his claim by
pointing to the fact that most cases applying § 856(a) involved major drug
warehouses, manufacturing operations, or actual crack houses.95 His car
dealership, he claimed, was not in the same category.96
84. Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
88. Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.
89. Id. (holding that “under § 856(a)(2), the person who manages or controls the building
and then rents to others, need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug related activity
take place”).
90. 941 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 774.
92. Id. at 772.
93. Id. at 773. Tamez asserted that the statute’s short title—“Establishment of
manufacturing operations”—and a summary of the provision in the Congressional Record that
described the statute as one that “[o]utlaw[s] operation of houses or buildings, so called ‘crack
houses’ where ‘crack,’ cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used,” showed that the
statute was intended to be applied more narrowly and therefore did not cover his premises. Id.
(quoting 132 CONG. REC. S13779 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986)).
94. See id.
95. Id. (citing a series of cases in which the statute was applied to large-scale, coordinated
drug activity, including United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1988) (meth lab);
United States v. Martinez-Zyas, 857 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1988) (cocaine warehouse and
packaging facility); United States v. Bethancurt, 692 F. Supp. 1427 (D.D.C. 1988) (crack
house); United States v. Restrepo, 698 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (cocaine warehouse)).
96. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing Chen for justification.97 Because the
court deemed the text unambiguous, it rejected Tamez’s arguments relying
on the statute’s short title and on language in the Congressional Record.98
Applying the logic from Chen, the court stated that in order for § 856(a)(1)
and § 856(a)(2) to have meaning, they must not overlap in such a way as to
make one superfluous of the other.99 To prevent this, the court ruled that
§ 856(a)(1) requires a defendant have the “intention to manufacture,
distribute, or use a controlled substance,” whereas § 856(a)(2) was “intended
to prohibit an owner from providing a place for illegal conduct” and thus only
requires that the illegal activity was present and that the defendant knowingly
allowed its continuance, with no focus on the defendant’s intent.100 Thus,
the court held that applying § 856(a)(2) to Tamez was proper.101
The Eighth Circuit also followed Chen’s interpretation of the statute in
United States v. Tebeau.102 Tebeau owned 300 acres of property in Missouri
called “Camp Zoe” where he hosted a number of music festivals between
2004 and 2010.103 During a nearly sixteen-month investigation prompted by
festival-related drug arrests, undercover officers attended ten festivals and
made over “150 controlled purchases of illegal drugs” ranging from
“psychedelic mushrooms [and] ecstasy” to “cocaine, LSD, [and] opium.”104
Officers witnessed frequent and blatant drug use during the festivals, and
they estimated that around $500,000 of illegal drugs were sold at each
event.105
Tebeau’s knowledge of the extensive drug activity taking place at Camp
Zoe was evident. He attended nearly every festival, admitted that he was
aware of drug sales occurring on the property, and operated “Safestock,” an
on-site medical facility where attendees were treated for overdoses.106 Camp
Zoe employees told officers that Tebeau instructed them on which drugs were
allowed at the camp and that Tebeau told security guards to move drug
dealers away from the front gates to avoid officers detecting them.107
Tebeau was charged with violating § 856(a)(2) of the crack house statute
for “managing a drug involved premises.”108 The Eighth Circuit, in
upholding Tebeau’s conviction, referenced Chen and the other circuits that
relied on the Chen court’s reasoning as support for concluding that

97. Id. at 774 (“We reject Tamez’ argument on the logic of Chen.”).
98. Id. at 773–74.
99. See id. at 773.
100. Id. at 774.
101. Id.
102. 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 957–58.
104. Id. at 958.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Since Tebeau was decided after the 2003 amendments to the crack house statute,
the court applied the current version of § 856(a)(2). See id.
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§ 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement did not require proof that Tebeau himself
had the intent to manufacture, distribute, or use controlled substances.109
These cases illustrate the typical reading of the crack house statute by
circuit courts: Section 856(a)(1) requires a defendant to maintain a place for
his own purpose of engaging in drug activity, while § 856(a)(2) requires a
defendant to make a place available where he knows others might engage in
drug activity. Though primarily dealing with egregious drug activity, these
cases nevertheless provide a foundation for interpreting the statute in other
contexts.
II. THE BATTLE OF INTERPRETATIONS
In 2018, the city of Philadelphia announced that, in an attempt to curtail
the city’s record number of drug overdose deaths in 2017, it would support
the creation of supervised injection sites that would be run by private
nonprofits.110 In the following months, Safehouse, a nonprofit, was founded
to open supervised injection sites that would provide a multitude of services,
including “wound care, referrals to primary care,” and testing for HIV and
Hepatitis C.111 Safehouse also planned to connect visitors with social
services, other medical facilities, and housing opportunities.112 While
Safehouse planned to provide a wide range of services,113 the most notable—
and controversial—was its “consumption room” in which individuals could
use pre-acquired drugs under the supervision of trained medical
professionals.114
In 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Safehouse and its
president and treasurer, José Benitez.115 To block Safehouse from opening,
the complaint sought a declaratory judgment and argued that Safehouse’s
plans to operate a consumption room would violate 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2),
which makes it illegal for any person to “manage[] or control[] any place”
that they “knowingly and intentionally . . . make available for use . . . for the
purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance.”116
109. Id. at 959–60 (discussing the Chen court’s analysis of the statute, citing other cases
that follow such approach, and ultimately “agree[ing] with the other circuits that the ‘bare
meaning’ of the purpose requirement in § 856(a)(2) indicates that the government was not
required to prove that Tebeau had the intent to manufacture, distribute, or use a controlled
substance to convict him under the statute”).
110. See Press Release, supra note 23.
111. Frequently Asked Questions, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/
frequently-asked-questions#faqgeneral [https://perma.cc/63GF-M34C] (last visited Apr. 2,
2022).
112. Id.
113. The Safehouse Model, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/about/thesafehouse-model [https://perma.cc/95V9-QJ4C] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
114. Id.
115. United States v. Safehouse (Safehouse I), 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d,
985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021); Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment at 5, Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (No. 19-0519).
116. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 115, at 5 (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)).
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The case produced conflicting judicial opinions about the proper reading
of § 856(a)(2) and whether the statute prohibits the operation of supervised
injection sites like Safehouse’s proposed consumption room. The district
court held that Safehouse’s services would not violate § 856(a)(2).117 On
appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed, finding that Safehouse’s
proposed consumption room would violate § 856(a)(2).118
The following part delineates the major interpretations of the statute and
the support provided for each side.119 Part II.A details the Third Circuit’s
interpretation that § 856(a)(2) encompasses the activities of supervised
injection sites.120 Part II.B then outlines the competing view that § 856(a)(2)
does not reach supervised injection sites, focusing on the district court’s
interpretation in Safehouse I and on the dissent in Safehouse II.121
A. The Third Circuit Weighs In
This section explains the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the crack house
statute and its application to the safe injection site in Safehouse II. Part II.A.1
details the Third Circuit’s reasoning for finding that § 856(a)(2)’s purpose
requirement applies to a third party. Part II.A.2 then explains the Third
Circuit’s conclusion that, under its reading of the statute, a supervised
injection site—specifically Safehouse’s proposed consumption room—falls
within the statute’s scope.
1. Purpose Requirement Applies to a Third Party
The applicability of § 856(a)(2) to supervised injection sites hinges on the
phrase “for the purpose of.”122 The central question is whether this so-called
“purpose requirement” means that the defendant (who provides a place) must
have the intention or purpose that the place be used by someone else for drug
activity, or whether § 856(a)(2) merely means that a third party must have
the purpose of using that place for drug activity. In examining § 856(a)(2),
the Safehouse II majority relied on the provision’s plain language and the
analysis of other circuits to conclude that the purpose requirement is assigned
to the third party, not the defendant.123
117. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. at 585–86, 618.
118. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 229–30, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
119. The scope of this Note is limited to the case’s discussion of statutory interpretation.
It is important to note, however, that the Third Circuit evaluated, and ultimately rejected, the
argument that regardless of the statute’s interpretation, Safehouse’s services are legal because
the activities are local and fall outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 239–
43. For further discussion of this issue, see Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning,
and Local Innovation in Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1112–47 (2009); Longnecker, supra note 19, at 1163–77.
120. See infra Part II.A.
121. See infra Part II.B.
122. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (making it unlawful to “manage or control any place . . . and
knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or
using a controlled substance” (emphasis added)).
123. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 233–35.
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a. Textual Support
The Third Circuit, in Safehouse II, held that the plain text of § 856(a)(2)
requires third-party visitors—and importantly, not the defendant—to have
the “purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a
controlled substance”124 for a defendant to be convicted under the statute.125
This conclusion, according to the court, is supported through a close
examination of the text and structure of § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) when
read together as part of a statutory scheme.
Turning first to § 856(a)(1),126 the court stated that the text requires only
one actor: the defendant.127 This is because the two sets of actions in
§ 856(a)(1)’s text—(1) to “open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place” and
(2) to have a “purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using” drugs at that
place128—do not require a third party for their completion.129 For instance,
any actor is able to “maintain” an apartment or “us[e]” an illicit substance
entirely alone, regardless of the presence of any third party.130 This does not
mean that a person must work alone in order to be charged under
§ 856(a)(1),131 but the inquiry nevertheless turns on the defendant’s purpose
and not on the purpose of a third party.132 In other words, § 856(a)(1) forbids
a defendant “from operating a place for his own purpose of illegal drug
activity.”133
There is little, if any, disagreement that this is the correct interpretation of
§ 856(a)(1). All circuit courts that have evaluated § 856(a)(1)’s language
agree on this interpretation.134 Safehouse and the government also agreed
that this is the proper reading of § 856(a)(1),135 as did the district court.136
Although there is agreement regarding how § 856(a)(1) should be read, there
is considerable disagreement about how the overlaps and dissimilarities
between § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) should be interpreted in relation to each
other.

124. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
125. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 233.
126. The text of § 856(a)(1) makes it illegal to “knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or
maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
127. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 234.
128. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
129. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 234.
130. Id.
131. Id. (listing examples of instances in which a person working with others would still
fall under § 856(a)(1), such as a defendant using drugs with friends or manufacturing them
with a business partner, or a drug kingpin whose employees operate his drug business without
him ever touching said drugs himself).
132. Id.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. See id.
135. Id.; Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez at 41, Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225
(3d Cir. 2021) (No. 20-1422).
136. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 599 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.
2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).

2886

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

In contrast to its reading of § 856(a)(1), the Third Circuit explained that
§ 856(a)(2) requires at least two actors: the defendant and a third party.137
While no third party is explicitly mentioned in § 856(a)(2), the court
explained that the text’s “verbs require [a third party].”138 The court
elaborated that in order for a landlord to “rent” or “lease” a property, the
property has to be leased or rented to someone; for an owner to “profit from”
a place, someone else has to be willing to pay the owner; and for a person to
make a place “available for use,” someone has to be willing to use the
place.139 The specific inclusion of these verbs, all of which imply the
existence of an additional person, necessitates the presence of a third party in
addition to the defendant for the statute’s text to make sense.
After establishing that the plain text of § 856(a)(2) requires at least two
actors (the defendant and a third party), the court then determined which of
these actors each set of actions refers to. The Third Circuit identified three
sets of actions in § 856(a)(2): (1) to “manage or control any place”; (2) to
“rent, lease, profit from, or make [a place] available for use”; and
(3) “manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance” or
having the purpose to do so.140 According to the Third Circuit, the first two
sets of actions—(1) managing or controlling a place and (2) renting, leasing,
profiting from, or making such place available for use—refer to the
defendant.141 Then, the third party is subsequently the one who must actually
manufacture, store, distribute, or use a controlled substance, or have the
purpose to do so.142
In rebutting Safehouse’s argument that such a reading goes against the
presumption of consistent usage,143 the majority found that the differences in
phrasing between the subsections indicate that the word “purpose” has the
same meaning in both subsections, but that it refers to the purpose of different
people in each.144 The court explained that the phrase “for the purpose of”
in each subsection refers back to the word “‘use,’ its nearest reasonable
referent.”145 Thus, the person who “uses the property is the one who must

137. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 234.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2), which provides in relevant part: “knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use . . . the place for the purpose
of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance” (emphasis
added)).
140. Id. at 234–35 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 235.
143. Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 22; see also infra
notes 197–204 and accompanying text.
144. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 236 (“We presume that ‘purpose’ means the same thing in
both [subsections]. But we do not presume that the ‘purpose’ belongs to the same actor in
each paragraph.”).
145. Id. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 152–53 (2012)). According to Justice Antonin Scalia and
Professor Bryan A. Garner, the nearest-reasonable-referent canon provides that “[w]hen the
syntax involves something other than a parallel series of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or
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have the purpose.”146 Since the person who is using the place in § 856(a)(2)
is the third party, the court explained that it is therefore the third party’s
purpose that matters.147 In contrast, in § 856(a)(1), the person using the
property is the defendant, so it is the defendant’s purpose that is relevant
under that paragraph.148
The Third Circuit also stated that reading § 856(a)(2) to require a third
party to have the purpose of engaging in unlawful drug activity is the only
way to avoid making § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) redundant.149 Although
statutes may inevitably overlap, courts seek to avoid reading provisions in
such a way that renders one or more to be mere surplusage, especially those
placed in the same subsection.150 If the defendant were the one required to
have the “purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or
using a controlled substance” in § 856(a)(2), the court explained that there
would be no meaningful distinction between § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2).151
This is because there would be no person who would fall uniquely under
§ 856(a)(2) who does not already fall under § 856(a)(1) if both provisions
were interpreted as requiring the defendant to act “for the purpose” of illicit
drug activity.152
The court further emphasized that its interpretation avoids redundancy
between § 856(a)(1)’s intent requirement and § 856(a)(2)’s purpose
requirement.153 The word “intentionally” was only added to the text of
§ 856(a)(2) and is notably absent from § 856(a)(1).154 Fundamentally, both
intent and purpose require a person to will something.155 Because of this, to
have a purpose of engaging in unlawful drug activity—as is required by
§ 856(a)(2)—the person with such purpose must intend for that illicit drug
postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable referent.” SCALIA &
GARNER, supra, at 152.
146. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 236.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 233.
150. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015).
151. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 235.
152. Id. The majority rejected a series of proposed examples that Safehouse argued
demonstrated a distinction between § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) under its suggested
interpretation that § 856(a)(2) requires the defendant to act for the purpose of illegal drug
activity. The court rejected Safehouse’s argument that § 856(a)(1) covers a crack house
operator, while § 856(a)(2) covers a “distant landlord,” because the distant landlord would fall
under either provision as “he has ‘rent[ed]’ and ‘maintain[ed]’ a place for drug activity.” Id.
(alterations in original). Safehouse also argued that under its interpretation, an owner who
allows her boyfriend to run a drug ring from her apartment while the owner is away at work
would only fall under § 856(a)(2), but the court rejected this argument on the basis that if the
owner did not have the purpose of using her apartment for drug sales, then she would be
excluded under both provisions. Id. If she did have the purpose of using her apartment for
such drug sales, she would then be liable under both provisions. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 235–36. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (making it unlawful, in part, to
“knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place” (emphasis added)), with 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(2) (making it unlawful, in part, to “knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit
from, or make [a place] available for use” (emphasis added)).
155. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 235–36.
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activity to occur.156 According to the Third Circuit, if § 856(a)(2) requires
the defendant have the intent for drug activity to occur at the place (i.e., the
purpose requirement applies to the defendant), then the defendant would
have to both “intentionally” make a place available for use and intend that
the place be used for the “purpose” of unlawfully using drugs.157 If this were
the case, then § 856(a)(2)’s two volitional requirements—intent and
purpose—would be redundant because “[o]ne cannot have a purpose of
unlawful drug activity without intending that activity.”158 But if the purpose
requirement in § 856(a)(2) applies to a third-party visitor—as the Third
Circuit holds—then the defendant has the intent requirement, while the third
party has the purpose requirement, saving the two words from redundancy
and giving meaning to every word in the provision.159 This interpretation,
the Third Circuit explained, is also supported by other circuits that have
analyzed the statute.
b. Circuit Court Support
The Third Circuit identified six other circuits that read the two subsections
in § 856(a) in the same manner, explaining that not only have these circuits
interpreted the statute the same way, but no circuit has held otherwise.160
The Safehouse II majority acknowledged that no circuit has been confronted
with applying the statute to a safe injection site and that all the other circuit
cases instead involved rather egregious drug activity, often with the close
involvement of the defendant.161 Though the factual circumstances in those
cases are different than one involving a supervised injection site, the Third
Circuit found this difference irrelevant for purposes of statutory
interpretation because the other circuits that previously analyzed the statute
“recognize[d] the textual difference between the defendant’s own purpose
under paragraph (a)(1) and the third party’s purpose under (a)(2).”162
The court refused to look at legislative history, determining that the text
itself unambiguously assigns the purpose requirement to the third party, and
therefore found it unnecessary to try to parse through Congress’s intent.163
The court also found it unnecessary to use the rule of lenity,164 as the statute
is “clear enough, not ‘grievously ambiguous,’” after employing the
traditional tools of statutory construction.165
156. Id. at 236.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 235–36 (explaining that “the intent requirement would make no sense layered
on top of requiring the defendant to have the purpose,” but that it is logical “to require the
defendant’s intent on top of the third party’s purpose”).
159. See id. at 236.
160. Id. (listing cases from the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals).
161. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.
162. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 236.
163. Id. at 238–39.
164. For a discussion of the rule of lenity, see infra note 253 and accompanying text.
165. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 236 (quoting United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 173
(2014)).
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After concluding that § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement refers to a third
party, the Third Circuit went on to address whether, under this interpretation
of the statute, Safehouse’s operation of a supervised injection site would
violate § 856(a)(2).
2. Supervised Injection Sites Violate § 856(a)(2)
This section details the Safehouse II majority’s reasoning for concluding
that, since under § 856(a)(2) it is a third party who must have the purpose
that drug activity occurs, Safehouse’s planned consumption room would
violate the crack house statute.
After conducting its statutory interpretation, the court turned to whether
visitors to Safehouse’s consumption room would satisfy the purpose
requirement and ultimately concluded that they would.166 The Third Circuit,
agreeing with the district court167 and the other circuit courts,168 determined
that the third party must have a “significant purpose” of drug activity in order
to violate the statute.169 In support of this determination, the court first
explained that since § 856(a)(2) states that a third party must act “for the
purpose”—and not a purpose—of drug activity occurring, in deciding
whether a defendant has violated the statute, the third party’s purpose of drug
activity taking place must be more than “merely incidental.”170 However,
the court made clear that the third party’s purpose need not be the sole
purpose,171 first, because a person is capable of having multiple purposes at
once, and second, because Congress chose not to write “for the sole purpose”
in the text of § 856(a)(2) despite having done so in other statutes.172 Thus,
for Safehouse to be liable under § 856(a)(2), it is not necessary that
Safehouse’s visitors go to Safehouse with the sole motivation of using
drugs.173 Because the Third Circuit found that a third party’s purpose must
lie somewhere between “sole” and “incidental,” the court agreed with the
district court and other circuits in concluding that a third party must act with
a significant purpose of engaging in drug activity to violate the statute.174
Though the court acknowledged that some visitors might go to Safehouse
for services other than using the consumption room, the court stated that the
“main attraction” of a supervised injection site is the opportunity to use drugs

166. Id. at 237–38.
167. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 607–08 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 643 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1997).
169. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 237.
170. Id. (quoting United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
171. Id.
172. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 48(d)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 62, and 17 U.S.C. § 120(d)(1)
as examples of Congress writing the phrase “for the sole purpose” in a statutory provision).
173. See id.
174. See id. The court also stated that a person can have multiple significant purposes and
still be held liable under the statute if one of those significant purposes is to use drugs at the
facility. Id. at 237–38.
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at the facility.175 The majority reasoned that many of Safehouse’s other
services and offerings revolve around visitors’ drug use, including access to
clean syringes, overdose-reversal agents, and counseling.176 From this, the
Third Circuit concluded that when a person visits a safe injection site to
prevent a drug overdose, “that reason is bound up with the significant purpose
of doing drugs,” satisfying the statutory requirement.177
The majority rejected counterarguments that its reading was too broad and
would target activity outside the intended purpose of the statute. Specifically,
the majority rejected the contention that its interpretation would “punish
parents for housing their drug-addicted children, or homeless shelters for
housing known drug users,” explaining that in such examples, the third party
“use[s] these places to eat, sleep, and bathe.”178 This would make the third
party’s “drug use in homes or shelters . . . incidental to living there,” in
contrast with the visitors to Safehouse, whose drug use would “be a
significant purpose of their visit.”179
Even if § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement applied to the defendant and not
to a third party, the court explained that supervised injection sites would
nevertheless violate the statute because they have a significant purpose of
visitors using drugs.180 While Safehouse argued that it had several purposes,
including stopping overdoses, providing medical care, and preventing
disease,181 the Third Circuit reiterated that a defendant can have multiple
purposes at once, and a significant purpose of a safe injection site is to have
its visitors use drugs.182 Supervised injection sites, including Safehouse,
expect visitors to bring pre-obtained drugs with them to use in the facility,
and the sites offer visitors advice on how to ingest these drugs safely, supply
visitors with clean syringes, and provide fentanyl strips to test the drugs.183
Additionally, the court stressed that “motive is distinct from mens rea” and
though Safehouse’s intentions may be admirable, this does not insulate them
from liability under § 856(a)(2).184
B. Not So Fast: Opposition to the Third Circuit’s Interpretation
Though the Safehouse II majority reads the crack house statute as
outlawing supervised injection sites, the dissenting opinion and the district
court’s opinion interpret the statute differently.185 This section examines the
view that supervised injection sites do not fall under the statute’s purview.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 237–38.
177. Id. at 238.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 1.
182. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 238.
183. Id.
184. Id. (providing other examples of well-intentioned individuals who would still be guilty
of crimes, such as a child stealing bread to feed his family being guilty of theft or a son
assisting his terminally ill parent in ending her life being guilty of murder).
185. See id. at 243 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
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1. The Purpose Requirement Refers to the Defendant
In contrast with the Third Circuit’s interpretation that § 856(a)(2)’s
purpose requirement refers to a third party’s purpose of drug activity,186
others contend that it refers to the defendant’s purpose187 or to the purpose
of the place where the drug activity is occurring.188 This section outlines the
view that § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement refers to the defendant’s
purpose of facilitating drug use.
a. Textual Support
Proponents of this view argue that, on its face, § 856(a)(2) reads most
naturally as requiring the defendant to have the purpose that others use the
property for unlawful drug activities. As the Third Circuit admits, there is
no third party named in § 856(a)(2)’s text.189 Therefore, proponents argue
that to predicate a defendant’s criminal liability “on the ‘purpose’ of a third
party who is neither named nor described in the statute” is exceptionally
unusual.190 This broad reading of the statute is even more odd, proponents
explain, because it “criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct—here, lawfully
making your property ‘available for use’” based on this unnamed third
party’s “subjective thoughts.”191
Additionally, proponents claim that § 856(a)(2)’s grammatical
construction suggests that the defendant is the one who must possess the
“purpose” of having illegal drug activity occur.192 The “grammar canon”
provides that words should be read in accordance with the meaning that
proper grammar and usage would assign them.193 In § 856(a)(2), the phrase
“for the purpose of” modifies the preceding set of verbs: “rent, lease, profit
from, or make available for use.”194 As noted in Safehouse I, the subject of

186. See supra Part II.A.1.
187. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 592 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
188. See Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 23. Safehouse
argued that the relevant purpose in § 856(a)(2) is the purpose for which the “place” in question
is used, which can be determined by looking at both the purpose of the owner and the
“operation of and physical functions within the facility.” Id.; see also Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp.
3d at 595. This does not necessarily mean the same thing as the purpose of the defendant, but
as the district court explained, the difference is negligible. See discussion infra note 195. Thus,
this Note largely treats these arguments as one.
189. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 234.
190. See id. at 243 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment). In her dissent,
Judge Roth notes that it is rare, if not unheard of, for a statute to have a defendant’s liability
turn on the mental state of a third party: “I know of no statute, other than section 856(a)(2),
in which the ‘purpose’ of an unnamed third party would be the factor that determines the mens
rea necessary for a defendant to violate the statute.” Id. at 245.
191. Id. at 245 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)).
192. See, e.g., Safehouse I, 408 Supp. 3d at 597.
193. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145, at 140.
194. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597.
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these verbs is the defendant who is charged with violating the statute.195
Since it is the defendant who performs these verbs, and the purpose
requirement is modifying those verbs that the defendant must perform, it is
the defendant who must act “for the purpose of” illicit drug activity, not a
third party.196
Supporters of this interpretation also compare the language of § 856(a)(1)
and § 856(a)(2) to reinforce their reading. Looking at the text and structure
of both subsections together, proponents note that there are numerous
similarities between the two. Both § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) have the same
subject: “any person.”197 Both have a knowledge requirement—
“knowingly” or “knowingly and intentionally”—followed by a group of
verbs and a direct object—“place.”198 Notably, both subsections conclude
with the same “for the purpose of” clause barring illicit drug activity.199
Proponents argue that the similarities between § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2)
should not be read to mean different things in each provision, as this would
violate established rules of statutory construction, specifically the
presumption of consistent usage.200 The presumption of consistent usage
directs those interpreting a text’s language to presume that words or phrases
used in different parts of the same statute have the same meaning in each
part.201 It is especially relevant when two statutory provisions containing the
same language are closely related to each other,202 as in § 856(a)(1) and
§ 856(a)(2). Because courts universally agree that the “for the purpose of”
language in § 856(a)(1) refers to the defendant’s purpose,203 proponents
argue that it therefore makes little sense for this identical language to be read
differently in § 856(a)(2).204
Supporters of this view also argue that reading § 856(a)(2)’s purpose
requirement to apply to the defendant does not make it impermissibly
redundant of § 856(a)(1), contrary to the Third Circuit’s interpretation.205
The district court, for instance, explained that § 856(a)(1) refers to a
195. Id. While Safehouse asked the district court to read “for the purpose of” as modifying
“the place” instead of the defendant’s actions, the court explained that “a place does not carry
an inherent purpose separate from a person’s intentions for its use,” and therefore, though
“purpose” should modify the defendant’s acts, the distinction in essence makes no difference
because the purpose of the place and the defendant would be identical. Id. at 597 n.18.
196. Id. at 597.
197. The district court noted that the subject of both paragraphs in § 856(a) is identified in
the text of § 856(b), which establishes the criminal penalties for “[a]ny person who violates
subsection (a).” Id. at 595 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 856(b)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.; see also Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.) (Roth, J., dissenting in part
and dissenting in judgment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
201. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145, at 170 (“A word or phrase is presumed to bear
the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in
meaning.”).
202. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76,
121, 147–48 (2021).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 126–36.
204. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 595–96.
205. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 235.
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defendant using his property for his own drug activity, while § 856(a)(2)
refers to a defendant who makes his property available for the purpose of
others engaging in such illegal drug activity.206 The difference, according to
the court, is that under § 856(a)(2), the defendant need not be personally
involved in the drug activity but must still have an illicit intention for others
to partake in that activity on the defendant’s property.207
The Safehouse II dissent found the provisions to be distinct from each
other because each has different actus reus requirements,208 with § 856(a)(1)
having only one actus reus element—“open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any
place”209—while § 856(a)(2) has two210—“manage or control any place” and
“rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use.”211 According to the
dissent, under this interpretation, “a rave operator who encourages drug
dealers to attend events in order to increase attendance” could be liable under
§ 856(a)(2), but not under § 856(a)(1).212
Thus, under these readings, § 856(a)(1) is aimed at individuals who are
“the non-owner operator of the property,” while § 856(a)(2) targets those
who are “typically the owner landlord or manager” of the property.213
Following this approach, § 856(a)(1) should be read to apply to defendants
who “rent, lease, or use” a place for the defendant’s own purpose of engaging
in drug activity, while § 856(a)(2) should be read to apply to the defendant
who provides a place for use with the purpose that others engage in drug
activity at that place, such as a crack house operator.
b. Questioning Other Circuits
Those who disagree with the majority’s interpretation in Safehouse II
assert that the court relied on improper precedent to support its reading of the
statute. For instance, proponents argue that the cases the Third Circuit
invoked involve egregious and rampant drug activity taking place on the
defendants’ properties and focus on defendants who encourage drug
distribution or drug activity.214 On the contrary, supervised injection sites
206. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 600.
207. Id.
208. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
Though there is no single definition, the actus reus of a crime is the voluntary act or omission
composing “the physical or external” part of a crime that accompanies the mental element, the
mens rea. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 83 (8th ed. 2018).
209. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
210. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
211. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
212. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 247.
213. Appellees Safehouse & José Benitez’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7–8,
Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021) (No. 20-1422).
214. Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 24–25, 36
(explaining that the particular scenarios in the cases cited by the government on appeal,
specifically the “drug motel” in Chen, the “cocaine-and-car dealership” in Tamez, and the
“drug-fueled music festival” in Tebeau, all involve “properties rife with drug dealing activity
from which the defendant reaped substantial financial benefits” and thus are distinguishable
from Safehouse’s activities).
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are “medical and public health facilit[ies]” that bear no resemblance to the
defendants in those cases.215 They therefore claim that the cases relied on by
the Third Circuit are not sufficiently analogous to be relevant in analyzing
the conduct of supervised injection sites under § 856(a)(2).
Additionally, the court in Safehouse I and the dissent in Safehouse II state
that the other circuits, in interpreting the statute, improperly rely on United
States v. Chen as the basis for reading § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement as
referring to a third party’s purpose.216 First, they note that the Chen court
did not explain its jump from the conclusion that the only actor who partakes
in drug activity under § 856(a)(2) is a third party to the subsequent conclusion
that the defendant therefore need not have an illicit purpose of such drug
activity occurring.217 The Chen court explained that the combination of the
words “knowingly” and “for the purpose of” indicate that, under § 856(a)(1),
it is the defendant’s purpose that is relevant.218 The court cited sixteen other
federal statutes in which the combination of “knowingly” and “for the
purpose of” clearly refers to the purpose of the defendant as support for its
reading of § 856(a)(1).219 However, the district court stated that the Fifth
Circuit gives no justification for why this same reasoning does not extend to
conclude that the purpose requirement in § 856(a)(2) also refers to the
defendant,220 since the same combination of “knowingly” and “for the
purpose of” is also present in § 856(a)(2).221 Though the additional word
“intentionally” immediately follows “knowingly” in § 856(a)(2)—unlike in
§ 856(a)(1)—the court explains that the inclusion of this additional mental
state in § 856(a)(2) is no reason to read the combination differently than in
§ 856(a)(1) and is especially no justification for reading § 856(a)(2) in such
a way that lowers the mental state required for conviction.222
Further, the Chen court applied the 1986 version of the statute, when the
only overlap between § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) was the phrase “for the
purpose of,”223 which, according to the Safehouse II dissent, the Chen court
215. See id. at 24–25.
216. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 598–601 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225
(3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021); see also Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 246
(Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment) (citing cases from the Second,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
217. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 598–99; see also Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 246
(Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
218. United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990).
219. Id. at 190 n.9.
220. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 598–99.
221. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (reading in part: “knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit
from, or make available for use . . . the place for the purpose of” illicit drug activity (emphasis
added)).
222. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 598.
223. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1841(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-52
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)). The 1986 version made it unlawful to
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, lessee,
agent employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, or make
available for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure
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improperly read to have a different meaning in each subsection.224
Moreover, because the decision in Chen was rendered more than ten years
before the statute’s current version was enacted, the Fifth Circuit could not
look at the elucidating statements, made by Congress during the amendment
process in 2003, as to what the text of § 856(a) actually means.225 While the
Fifth Circuit could only apply the then current text, the district court found a
bigger issue with the willingness of other courts to follow Chen despite clear
statements from Congress that show its analysis is counter to the statute’s
purpose.226
c. Legislative History and Intent
Proponents of interpreting the statute to exclude supervised injection sites
also claim that the statute’s legislative history and intent bolster their
interpretation and disprove the Third Circuit’s reading. First, they contend
that Congress did not contemplate supervised injection sites when enacting
or amending the statute. The district court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania conducted a search of Congress’s records to determine whether
Congress wrote the statute with supervised injection sites in mind, finding
just one reference to supervised injection sites that was specifically in the
context of stopping the spread of HIV.227 The court also searched medical
literature for “safe injection sites” prior to the statute’s most recent
amendment to determine whether the facilities were within public
consciousness at the time of legislating.228 Though there were references to
such facilities prior to 2003, none were related to reducing opioid addiction,
which indicates, according to the court, that the activities of a supervised
injection site like Safehouse cannot fall within the statute’s reach.229
Additionally, proponents of this view cite the statute’s legislative history
as support for the interpretation that § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement refers
to the defendant’s purpose of facilitating drug activity and not a third party’s
purpose of engaging in drug activity. For instance, proponents cite
statements that then Senator Joe Biden230 made while introducing the
amendments to § 856(a) in 2003, saying, “Let me be clear. Neither current
law nor my bill seeks to punish a promoter for the behavior of their

for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a
controlled substance.
Id.
224. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225, 247 (3d Cir.) (Roth, J., dissenting in part and
dissenting in judgment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
225. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 601–04.
226. See id. at 601–03.
227. See id. at 615.
228. The district court searched PubMed, a medical literature database maintained by the
National Library of Medicine and the National Institutes of Health in collaboration with the
National Center for Biotechnology Information. Id.
229. Id. at 615–16.
230. Then Senator Biden was a sponsor of the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003
which originally contained the 2003 amendment. See Kreit, supra note 57, at 430–31.

2896

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

patrons.”231
According to Judge Jane Richards Roth’s dissent in
Safehouse II, this statement, along with then Senator Biden’s remark that the
“bill would help in the prosecution of rogue promoters who not only know
that there is drug use at their event but also hold the event for the purpose of
illegal drug use or distribution,”232 shows that the statute is focused on the
mental state of the defendant, not a third party.233 Further, Judge Gerald A.
McHugh in Safehouse I pointed to another statement that then Senator Biden
made before the vote on the conference report, in which Biden said that the
“bill is aimed at the defendant’s predatory behavior, regardless of the type
of drug or the particular place in which it is being used or distributed,”234
indicating to Judge McHugh that Congress, in expanding the statute in 2003,
was concerned with the defendant’s intention, not a third party’s intention.235
Safehouse and its supporters also argue that the legislative history provides
evidence that the statute targets actors who facilitate or encourage drug use,
not supervised injection sites that seek to reduce drug use and overdoses.
While introducing the proposed amendment, Senator Chuck Grassley, a
cosponsor, commented that the changes to the statute were an effort to
“update our laws so they can continue to be used effectively against drug
dealers who are pushing drugs on our kids.”236 He also emphasized that the
legislation targets events used as a “cover” for drug use and transactions,
even citing drug reduction efforts as an example of conduct that would be
inconsistent with criminal intent under the statute.237 Proponents who argue
that supervised injection sites do not fall under the crack house statute’s reach
thus cite this legislative history as evidence that the Third Circuit misread the
statute and expanded criminal liability beyond promoters of drug activity to
reach medical and health intervention services, such as supervised injection
sites, contrary to what they say the legislative history suggests.238
d. Consequences
Those who read § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement as applying to the
defendant’s purpose support this interpretation by citing several “absurd”
consequences they say would result from a contrary interpretation. Judge
Roth, in her Safehouse II dissent, illustrated this interpretation by providing
a series of hypothetical situations.239 For instance, she explained that under

231. 149 CONG. REC. 1847 (2003).
232. Id.
233. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.) (Roth, J., dissenting in part and
dissenting in judgment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
234. 149 CONG. REC. 9383 (2003) (emphasis added).
235. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
236. 149 CONG. REC. 1848 (2003).
237. Id. at 1848–49.
238. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21–22, Safehouse v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 142 S. Ct.
345 (2021) (No. 21-276).
239. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225, 244, 247–49 (3d Cir.) (Roth, J., dissenting in part and
dissenting in judgment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
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the majority’s interpretation, a parent who lets their “drug-addicted adult
son” live with them in order to monitor his drug use and prevent him from
overdosing could be held liable under § 856(a)(2).240 This is because the son
(the third party) would be using the place in question (the home) for a
significant purpose of engaging in unlawful drug activity.241 The majority
claimed that the hypothetical parent would not fall under § 856(a)(2)’s
purview because the son’s drug use is merely incidental to his other purpose
of using the place for shelter.242 Judge Roth countered that the majority’s
“incidental purpose” differentiation does not protect its reading of the statute
from inherently absurd results.243 In claiming that the son’s drug use would
be incidental to his purpose of shelter, the majority, according to Judge Roth,
assumes the child’s motivation, when the son’s primary purpose could be to
consume drugs in a place where there is a lower risk of overdosing.244 The
parents in question could therefore still be convicted under § 856(a)(2), a
“result [that] is far afield from the crack houses and raves targeted by the
statute.”245
Judge Roth also stated that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the statute
effectively outlaws a safe injection site’s services indoors, but would oddly
allow the same services to be provided outside with no consequences.246 She
explained that because the government asserts that the word “place” in the
statute refers to real property,247 offering individuals medical advice, clean
syringes, and overdose-reversal agents would be legal in nearly every other
context under the statute, such as outdoors or even in a “mobile van.”248 This
is because, under the majority’s interpretation, the defendant would not be
providing a relevant “place,”249 meaning the statute would be
inapplicable.250 Judge Roth added that police and emergency medical
services (EMS) already provide the care that Safehouse seeks to offer, the
only difference being that “[i]nstead of patrolling the streets for users who
have overdosed, Safehouse wants to save lives indoors.”251 According to
240. Id. at 247.
241. See id. at 248.
242. Id. at 238 (majority opinion).
243. Id. at 247 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
244. Id. at 248 (“If the son could not do drugs there, would he still move in? Alternatively,
the son might already have a home (or be indifferent to being homeless) but begrudgingly
accepted his parents’ invitation to move in with them because he shared their concern about
overdosing.”).
245. Id.
246. See id. at 249; see also Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note
135, at 40.
247. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 249 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in
judgment) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–39, Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225 (2021)
(No. 20–1422)).
248. See Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 40.
249. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (making it unlawful for a person to “manage or control any
place . . . and knowingly and intentionally . . . make available for use . . . the place for the
purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance”) (emphasis added).
250. See Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 40 (noting that
the government does not dispute the legality of these actions outdoors).
251. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 244 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
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proponents of this view, this distinction provides support for interpreting the
provision’s purpose requirement to refer to the defendant’s purpose and not
a third party’s.252
These examples are also used to support the position that the rule of
lenity253 is appropriate to consider in interpreting the statute. Because
reading the statute’s purpose requirement to apply to a third party’s purpose
and not the defendant’s could subject parents of children addicted to drugs or
operators of homeless shelters to criminal liability254—punishable by up to
twenty years in prison, for instance255—Safehouse cites the rule of lenity as
additional support for interpreting the statute to apply to the defendant256 and
for ultimately concluding that, under this interpretation, supervised injection
sites do not violate the statute.
2. Supervised Injection Sites Do Not Violate the Statute
After establishing that the statute’s purpose requirement refers to the
defendant, those who read the statute narrowly next determine that
supervised injection sites do not possess the purpose required by the statute.
In doing so, they first define what making a place available “for the purpose
of unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance” means in order to determine
whether supervised injection sites violate § 856(a)(2).257
Those who read the statute narrowly generally agree with the Safehouse II
majority that a person may have more than one purpose and still violate the
statute.258 In Safehouse I, Judge McHugh noted that requiring a defendant’s
purpose of unlawful drug use to be his sole purpose would mean the statute
“would fail to reach rave promoters who encourage dancing and drugs and

252. See Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 40 (“It cannot
be that Safehouse itself, as well as its leadership and personnel, would commit a 20-year felony
unless it insists that a person leave the safety of its shelter . . . at the very moment when access
to lifesaving medical supervision and care is most critical . . . .”).
253. The rule of lenity is a tool of statutory interpretation that “requires a court to resolve
statutory ambiguity in favor of a criminal defendant, or to strictly construe the statute against
the state.” David S. Romantz, Reconstructing the Rule of Lenity, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 523,
524 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145, at 296 (“Ambiguity in a statute
defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”).
254. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 248–49 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in
judgment) (adding that under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, operators of homeless
shelters who know that clients would use drugs on their property can be held criminally liable
under the statute).
255. 21 U.S.C. § 856(b).
256. See Brief of Appellees Safehouse and José Benitez, supra note 135, at 47. The district
court did “not rely on the rule of lenity as the basis for [its] decision” that the statute should
be read narrowly but did state that principles such as the separation of powers—which
underlies the rule of lenity—do “carry substantial weight.” Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583,
617–18 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345
(2021).
257. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
258. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 607; Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 251 (Roth, J.,
dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment); see also Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 237 (majority
opinion).
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crack house operators who live in the house and use it as a crack house.”259
He clarified that while the defendant’s purpose of unlawful drug use need not
be his only purpose, it must nevertheless be a “significant” or “primary”
purpose, citing as evidence the fact that the government acknowledged that
an incidental purpose would be insufficient and the fact that the view is
consistent with other courts’ interpretations.260
Turning to whether the statute’s purpose requirement prohibits the actions
of supervised injection sites, proponents of a narrow reading state that the
defendant must have a significant purpose of facilitating drug activity to
violate § 856(a)(2).261 In support of this interpretation, Judge McHugh first
explained that definitionally, “a purpose is something one seeks to advance,
‘something set up as an object or end to be attained.’”262 He then wrote that
the legislative history “indicates that the statute targets exploitive behavior
like that of crack house operators, rave promoters, and others creating spaces
to facilitate drug use and access to drugs,” who all have a common goal of
“enabling drug use and supporting the market for unlawful drugs.”263
Those who agree with this reading contend that supervised injection sites
do not violate the statute, as their purpose is to combat drug abuse, prevent
overdoses, and provide medical services to visitors, not to promote unlawful
drug use.264 Both Judge McHugh in Safehouse I and Judge Roth in her
Safehouse II dissent detailed Safehouse’s proposed efforts to not only stop
drug overdoses—such as by administering overdose-reversal agents and
offering fentanyl test strips to visitors—but also to encourage visitors to enter
rehabilitation programs by offering referrals to social services and treatment
facilities.265 Further, Judge Roth pointed out that visitors at supervised
injection sites like Safehouse do not need to use drugs to enter and use other
services.266 By offering medical intervention services to all visitors and
encouraging those who do use drugs to seek treatment, proponents conclude
that, contrary to the Third Circuit’s holding in Safehouse II, supervised

259. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
260. Id. at 607–08.
261. Id. at 614 (stating that to possess the required purpose under the statute, a defendant
must have a “significant purpose[] to facilitate, rather than reduce, unlawful drug use”);
Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 251 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment)
(explaining that a defendant must be “motivated at least in part by a desire for unlawful drug
activity to occur” in order to have “acted with the requisite purpose under” the statute).
262. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 609 (citing dictionary definitions of the word
“purpose”).
263. Id. at 613–14. For a discussion of the legislative history cited in support of this view,
see supra Part II.B.1.c.
264. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 613–14; Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 252 (Roth, J.,
dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment). In her dissent, Judge Roth also explains that
even if Safehouse’s purpose is to encourage drug use, it still does not violate the statute
because, under federal law, “using a controlled substance” is not unlawful, possession is.
Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 253.
265. Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 614; Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 251–52 (Roth, J.,
dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
266. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 244 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in judgment).
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injection sites do not have the significant purpose of facilitating drug use that
is required to violate the statute.
III. THE CASE FOR SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES UNDER THE CRACK
HOUSE STATUTE
While the Safehouse II opinion is limited to the Third Circuit, the decision
and its reasoning could have far-reaching implications for the future of
supervised injection sites in the United States. In July 2021, mere months
after the Third Circuit rendered its decision, Rhode Island became the first
state to authorize the creation of supervised injection facilities—called harm
prevention centers—contingent on the support of local communities.267 In
November 2021, New York City opened two supervised injection sites in
Manhattan, becoming the first city in the United States to have sites in
operation.268 Other localities are still considering and pushing for similar
bills, though they have yet to begin running any supervised injection sites.269
Though the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the statute confirmed what
some scholars speculated could occur should a court hear a challenge to a
supervised injection site,270 contrary interpretations from Judge McHugh in
Safehouse I and Judge Roth in the Safehouse II dissent draw attention to the
statute’s problems and cast doubt on whether the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute is sound. Ultimately, the power to resolve
whether the crack house statute applies to supervised injection sites lies in
the legislative hands of Congress.271 In the meantime, however, courts
cannot shirk their responsibility to interpret the statute as cases come before
them. Opening supervised injection sites and other harm reduction policies
are becoming increasingly popular proposals to reduce the devastating
consequences of the current overdose crisis in the United States,272 making
future cases against supervised injection sites a likely reality.273 Moreover,

267. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-12.10-1 (2022).
268. See Jeffery C. Mays & Andy Newman, Nation’s First Supervised Drug-Injection Sites
Open in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/
nyregion/supervised-injection-sites-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/YWW9-SX7P].
269. See sources cited supra note 20.
270. See Beletsky et al., supra note 19, at 234.
271. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 8.
272. See Brian Mann, Overdose Deaths Are So High That the Biden Team Is Embracing
Ideas Once Seen as Taboo, NPR (Oct. 27, 2021, 5:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/27/
1049245787/biden-hhs-tackle-drug-overdose-deaths [https://perma.cc/8ZNE-KSC6].
273. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Statement from U.S. Attorney Lelling
Regarding Drug Injection Sites (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/statementus-attorney-lelling-regarding-drug-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/77RZ-8AE8] (stating that
“efforts to open injection facilities, including here in Massachusetts, will be met with federal
enforcement”). Although the Biden administration seems unlikely to use the crack house
statute to target other supervised injection sites, there is no guarantee that future
administrations will not follow the approach of the Trump administration’s Department of
Justice, which chose to prosecute Safehouse. See Mann, supra note 272.
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the lives of thousands, if not millions, of Americans may depend on the very
real consequences of the interpretation.274
When evaluating the legality of a supervised injection site under 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(2), courts should interpret the text’s purpose requirement as
referring to the purpose of the defendant. This part argues that the statute
does not prohibit supervised injection sites. Part III.A explains that
§ 856(a)(2) is ambiguous as to what the phrase “for the purpose of
unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance”275 means, requiring an
examination beyond the text to determine the proper interpretation. Part III.B
then looks to other tools of statutory interpretation, specifically the legislative
history and the rule of lenity, to reach the conclusion that the crack house
statute does not prohibit supervised injection sites. Part III.C concludes by
arguing that separation of powers principles and the current state of the
nation’s drug overdose crisis supports a narrow interpretation of the crack
house statute.
A. The Plain Text Is Ambiguous at Best
Third Circuit Judge Theodore A. McKee may have said it best: “Four
judges have now examined the language of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Two
interpret it one way and two interpret it another.”276 While disagreement
regarding a statute’s interpretation does not necessarily render its text
ambiguous, the fact that a district court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit stated that the text is clear but reached
opposite conclusions as to whom § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement applies
strongly suggests that the purpose requirement is far from clear. This section
delves into the conflicting canons and tools of statutory interpretation used
throughout Safehouse I and II,277 arguing that the text alone cannot produce
a clear reading of the statute’s meaning and does not, in and of itself, support
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the statute.
1. What Do the Words Mean?
First, the language of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) does not elucidate whether the
defendant or a third party must have the stated purpose, as both conclusions
are plausible from looking at the text on its face. For instance, as Safehouse
contended in Safehouse I, “for the purpose of” immediately follows the word
“place,” signaling that the phrase must be modifying the word “place.”278
Since a place cannot have a purpose that is separate from that of its owner,
274. See Kristin M. Holland et al., Trends in US Emergency Department Visits for Mental
Health, Overdose, and Violence Outcomes Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 78
JAMA PSYCHIATRY 372, 376–77 (2021) (finding that emergency room visits for drug
overdoses increased during the COVID-19 pandemic).
275. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
276. United States v. Safehouse, 991 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2021) (McKee, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
277. This includes the arguments made at the district court level.
278. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
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the phrase “for the purpose of” refers to that owner.279 It could also be said
that because a place cannot have a purpose, the phrase “for the purpose of”
instead modifies the preceding list of verbs,280 which are all performed by
the defendant.281 These two readings of the statute’s plain text reasonably
support the conclusion that the purpose requirement belongs to the defendant,
not to an unnamed third party.282
On the other hand, § 856(a)(2)’s language could also suggest that it is the
third party who must have the requisite purpose. The text could indicate that
“for the purpose of” refers to the word “use,” the nearest reasonable referent
as the Third Circuit suggests.283 Since it is a third party who “uses” the place
for drug activity, the statute’s grammatical construction could lead to the
interpretation that only the third party must have the stated purpose to
unlawfully use drugs at the place and that the defendant need not facilitate or
encourage the drug use to be liable under the statute.284 These conflicting
interpretations illustrate how the statute, especially its purpose requirement,
is unclear on its face.
2. Dueling Canons
Delving further into canons of statutory interpretation does not help clarify
the statute’s meaning. Both sides employ different canons as support for
opposite conclusions regarding to whom the purpose requirement in
§ 856(a)(2) applies. This is because, for nearly every canon, there is a
counter-canon that points to a different interpretation.285 For example, the
Safehouse II majority relied on the surplusage canon to support the
conclusion that § 856(a)(2)’s text unambiguously requires a third party to
have a “purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance.”286 The
majority stated that any other interpretation would result in broad overlap
between § 856(a)(1) and § 856(a)(2) and would thus render § 856(a)(2)
useless since anyone who would fall under § 856(a)(2) would also fall under

279. See id.
280. For reference, the provision states that “it shall be unlawful to . . . knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use . . . the place for the purpose of
unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
281. See Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 597.
282. Id. at 597–98. The purpose of “the place” and the person who controls the place is the
same according to the court, and therefore “for the purpose of” modifies the verbs. Id. at 597
n.18.
283. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir.) (discussing the
nearest-reasonable-referent canon detailed by Justice Scalia and Professor Garner), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145, at 152 (explaining
the nearest-reasonable-referent canon).
284. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 236.
285. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules of
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)
(explaining that “there are two opposing canons on almost every point”).
286. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 233, 235 (stating that reading § 856(a)(2)’s purpose
requirement to apply to the defendant as opposed to a third party would mean “(a)(2) would
do no independent work” from § 856(a)(1) and create a “fatal” redundancy).
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its sister provision.287 However, others contend that reading § 856(a)(2)’s
purpose requirement to apply to the defendant produces some, but not fatal,
overlap between the provisions.288
Meanwhile, the Safehouse II dissent and the Safehouse I opinion used the
presumption of consistent usage to support the conclusion that § 856(a)(2)
requires the defendant to have the purpose that others engage in unlawful
drug activity at the place the defendant provides.289 When reading the two
subsections, the Safehouse II dissent and the Safehouse I opinion claim that
one should presume that the identical language used in § 856(a)(1) should
carry the same meaning in § 856(a)(2).290 The Safehouse II majority,
however, contends that the purpose requirement merely applies to a different
person, not that it has a different meaning under its interpretation.291
While canons do not necessarily hold equal weight in every case,292 their
use on each side of this debate cannot be said to definitively support the
conclusion that the purpose requirement in § 856(a)(2) must apply to a third
party. It is difficult to dismiss either interpretation, as the provisions have
similarities suggesting that they should be read consistently with one another.
Doing so, however, arguably narrows the scope of who could plausibly be
charged and convicted solely under § 856(a)(2). While there may be
good-faith disagreement as to which interpretation is correct, it cannot be said
that the text unambiguously supports one conclusion over the other. For this
reason, a court interpreting the applicability of § 856(a)(2) to a supervised
injection site should look beyond the statute’s text, where it then becomes
clear that the proper interpretation of the statute excludes applying the statute
to supervised injection sites.
B. Shedding Light: Using Extratextual Tools Reveals the True Meaning of
the Statute
This section sets forth the extratextual tools that courts should look to in
interpreting § 856(a)(2) when confronted with the question of whether the
statute prohibits supervised injection sites. Part III.B.1 explains how the
statute’s legislative history provides support for the interpretation articulated
by the Safehouse I opinion and the Safehouse II dissent. Part III.B.2
discusses the rule of lenity as an additional tool that lends support for such
an interpretation.

287. See supra text accompanying notes 149–59.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 205–13.
289. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 245 (Roth, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in
judgment) (“The Majority offers no reason to disregard this presumption.”); see also
Safehouse I, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 597–98 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d, 985 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2021),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 197–204.
291. Safehouse II, 985 F.3d at 236 (“We presume that ‘purpose’ means the same thing in
both. But we do not presume that the ‘purpose’ belongs to the same actor in each paragraph.”).
292. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145, at 59 (“No canon of interpretation is absolute.
Each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles that point in other directions.”).
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1. Legislative History
Since the text of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) can reasonably be interpreted in
multiple ways, courts evaluating the legality of a supervised injection site
under § 856(a)(2) should look to the legislative context to determine its
meaning. It is when one looks to this legislative context that it becomes clear
that the Third Circuit’s interpretation is contrary to the meaning of the statute,
which does not prohibit the kinds of services that supervised injection sites
offer.
First, the crack house statute’s legislative history clarifies that the proper
reading of § 856(a)(2) requires the defendant to have the proscribed purpose
of facilitating drug use, not a third party. Then Senator Biden’s repeated
statements in 2003 during the bill’s introduction and debates on the
conference report emphasize that the statute is “aimed at the defendant’s
predatory behavior”293 and that the statute requires a defendant to have both
the knowledge and the intention that the event or place facilitate drug use or
distribution, not mere awareness that his place is being used for drug use.294
When Senator Patrick Leahy expressed concerns over the amendments going
too far and criminalizing legitimate businesses,295 then Senator Biden later
assured that the changes give “federal prosecutors the tools needed to combat
the manufacture, distribution or use of any controlled substance at any venue
whose purpose is to engage in illegal narcotics activity.”296 Nearly every
statement in the Congressional Record supports the interpretation that the
relevant purpose in § 856(a)(2) is the defendant’s, not a third party’s.297 Yet
the Third Circuit, in finding the statute unambiguous, refused to look at this
evidence that directly contradicts its interpretation.
Second, the legislative context shows that the crack house statute never
contemplated, and therefore does not extend to, medical intervention
facilities like supervised injection sites. The 1986 enactment of the statute
was specifically concerned with crack houses,298 with the section-by-section
description of the statute stating it “[o]utlaws operation of houses or
buildings, so-called ‘crack houses,’ where ‘crack’ cocaine and other drugs
are manufactured and used.”299 The 2003 amendments were concerned with
rogue rave promoters and with curbing the use of club drugs like ecstasy.300
While there is at least one statement made by Senator Grassley referencing
“illegal drug use in any location” that could lend support to a contrary
293. 149 CONG. REC. 1846, 9383 (2003) (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 1847 (explaining that the amended statute “help[s] in the prosecution of rogue
promoters who not only know that there is drug use at their event but also hold the event for
the purpose of illegal drug use or distribution”).
295. Id. at 9378 (expressing concern that the expansion of the statute would hold business
owners “personally accountable for the illegal acts of others”).
296. Id. at 9383 (emphasis added).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 230–38.
298. See Jacob A. Epstein, Note, Molly and the Crack House Statute: Vulnerabilities of a
Recuperating Music Industry, 23 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 95, 103 (2014).
299. 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986).
300. See Kreit, supra note 57, at 430.
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interpretation of the statute,301 the remainder of Senator Grassley’s
comments support a much narrower interpretation than the Third Circuit’s
reading provides for.302
The statute also makes no mention of supervised injection sites or drug
overdose prevention efforts, and as Judge McHugh discussed in Safehouse I,
supervised injection sites were not in the public discourse in the United States
at the time of the statute’s enactment or amendments.303 Though statutes
may often reach activities and situations different from their original
contemplations, criminalizing activity that is fundamentally aligned with the
goal of the statute steps beyond the intent of the text. By refusing to look at
Congress’s intent, the Third Circuit expands the reach of a statute intended
to stop individuals who facilitate drug use and distribution, like rogue rave
promoters and crack house operators, to encompass medical intervention
sites proven to reduce crime, lower drug use, and save lives.304
2. Rule of Lenity
Courts interpreting § 856(a)(2) should also use the rule of lenity in
assisting their interpretive analysis. As previously discussed, the Third
Circuit dismissed applying the rule of lenity when interpreting the application
of § 856(a)(2)’s purpose requirement to supervised injection sites because it
found no ambiguity that would necessitate using the rule.305 But, as
discussed above, looking solely at the text of the statute does not provide
clarity.306 To the contrary, the statute’s text is unclear, evidenced by its
grammatical structure and conflicting canons of statutory interpretation,
which provide support for multiple interpretations. Further, when looking at
legislative intent and history, there is ample support for the interpretation that
the purpose requirement refers to the defendant’s purpose of facilitating or
encouraging drug activity to occur at the defendant’s property.307 To the
extent that a person reading the statute could still find its meaning ambiguous
after considering its legislative history, the rule of lenity provides additional
support for rejecting the Third Circuit’s interpretation.
There are various standards as to what level of ambiguity must exist to
properly consider lenity in interpreting a statute.308 However, there hardly
seems to be a more appropriate time to consider lenity than when a vague
criminal statute carrying hefty penalties309 is applied to facilities that were
301. 149 CONG. REC. 1848 (2003) (“Illegal drug use in any location should not be tolerated,
regardless of what cover activity is created to hide the transaction.”).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 236–37.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 227–29.
304. See supra Part I.A.
305. See Safehouse II, 985 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 345 (2021).
306. See supra Part III.A.
307. See supra Part III.B.1.
308. See Romantz, supra note 253, at 566–67 (explaining that the Supreme Court has
“offered no less than nine different tests to determine whether statutory ambiguity is bad
enough to trigger lenity”).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 69–71.
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not contemplated at the time of the statute’s enactment310 and that seek to
directly prevent the types of activities the statute explicitly criminalizes. The
possibility that, under a broad reading of the statute, a sister could be held
criminally liable and face up to twenty years in prison for supervising her
brother’s drug use in her own home for the purpose of preventing him from
overdosing exemplifies why lenity is appropriate when interpreting the
statute. If it is unclear whether the statute applies to supervised injection
sites, it is within the nation’s best interest to err on the side of leniency and
wait for Congress to explicitly make clear what the statute means.
C. Other Principles Support a Narrow Reading
Overall, the extratextual tools, as well as the text of the statute, indicate
that the statute does not apply to supervised injection sites. An interpretation
of the statute that considers extratextual evidence allows for the consideration
of critical context that provides an understanding of the statute that the
statute’s pure text does not.
Ignoring extratextual evidence when interpreting the statute also threatens
the fundamental separation of powers by handing over lawmaking powers to
the courts. Separation of powers principles hold that Congress has the power
to make laws while courts have the power to interpret those laws.311
Congress never contemplated outlawing harm reduction measures designed
to prevent drug overdoses when criminalizing crack house operators and rave
promoters in the statute. Operating supervised injection sites is an act that
only Congress can make a crime, and by reading the statute to apply broadly
to medical intervention facilities, courts usurp powers that belong exclusively
to Congress.312 While it may not be necessary to turn to extratextual tools in
every case, where there exists such ambiguity as to what the statute means
and to whom it applies, importing context from reasonable sources outside
of the text is necessary to garner the true meaning of the statute and for the
courts to properly do their jobs in saying what the law is.313
Finally, it is important to note that the law does not exist in a vacuum. The
current reality is that the United States is suffering from a drug overdose
crisis that shows no signs of slowing.314 While only Congress can
definitively provide answers as to what the statute means and how far it
reaches, courts should not use this as an opportunity to criminalize life-saving
actions that are otherwise legal. To interpret the statute otherwise not only
would be inconsistent with the text’s meaning and with constitutional
310. See supra Part III.B.1.
311. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 176, 178–79 (1803).
312. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (stating that “because criminal
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not
courts should define criminal activity”).
313. See, e.g., William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 547 (2017) (“What makes little sense is a blanket prohibition against
considering pertinent nontextual information if statutory language is ‘clear.’ This is especially
so if the courts’ main concern is interpretive accuracy—that is, getting it right.”).
314. See Press Release, supra note 7.
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principles but also would jeopardize the lives of millions suffering from
addiction and punish those who try to help them.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Congress has the final say on whether the crack house statute’s
meaning is properly articulated by the Third Circuit in Safehouse II. In the
meantime, a court evaluating the legality of a supervised injection site under
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) should read the statute narrowly and consider it
inapplicable to medical intervention facilities like supervised injection sites.
The statute’s text is ambiguous at best, and courts should, therefore, turn to
extratextual tools to resolve the ambiguity. Both the legislative context and
the rule of lenity favor a narrow reading of the crack house statute, and
constitutional principles support such an interpretation. Congress enacted
the crack house statute to reach illicit drug activity and those who help
promote it. Congress did not enact the statute to stop life-saving medical
intervention efforts from being implemented. To read the statute otherwise
would twist its meaning and would be both legally and morally untenable.

